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INTRODUCTION

The history of men's opposition to women's emancipation is more interest-

ing than the story of that emancipation itself.
Virginia Woolf, 1929.

In Australia, as in the United States, women throughout legal history have been relegated to the status of second-class citizens. This
Essay focuses on the struggles of women in both countries in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to overcome opposition to their
equal participation as citizens. In particular, this Essay focuses on opposition by all-male judiciaries to women's struggles to attain full
citizenship rights, including the right to vote and the right to practice

* Lecturer, University of Adelaide Lav School; BEc, LLB (Hons) (Adel); GDLP
(USA); LLM (Cantab).
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law. As will be shown, although these struggles occurred in different
legal and constitutional frameworks, the judicial reasoning invoked to
deny women these citizenship rights was remarkably similar and had
the effect of entrenching their traditional subordinate role in society.
This Essay illustrates the narrow view of women's citizenship held by
the judiciary during this period. Underlying the legal reasoning of the
courts was an assumption that women's legal status was fundamentally
different from that of men, and that women possessed only those specific rights, privileges, and immunities that the all-male legislatures
chose to grant them. Legislation that granted women citizenship rights,
including the right of suffrage, was narrowly interpreted by male judges who were not prepared to disregard women's common law disabilities and extend women's citizenship status in the absence of clear
words. This Essay also illustrates that the Australian judiciary was
unwilling to recognize women as full citizens, even after women had
been granted the right to vote. In both Australia and the United States,
each right, privilege, and immunity of citizenship, taken for granted
where the subject was male, had to be contested by women.
II. SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL
Australia and the United States inherited a tradition in which gender defined the geography of social life.' This geography saw men as
the inhabitants of the "public" sphere of political and commercial activity, and women as occupying the "private" sphere of domestic life.
These separate spheres of society had firmn ideological foundations.
"Until the mid-nineteenth century, virtually every major theologian and
philosopher relegated women to a subordinate role."2 The use of supposedly gender-neutral terms such as "man," "mankind," and "he" in
the works of the philosophers concealed the fact that the "human nature" of which they spoke was intended to refer to male human nature

1. DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEx DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 9
(1989).
2. Id
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only? However, for these philosophers, women's exclusion from "mankind" did not mean their exclusion from society altogether. Women's
role in society was defined by their sexual, procreative, and child-rearing functions within the institution of the family. The biological differences between the sexes were seen as entailing all the other conventional and institutional differences in sex roles.4 Not only were women
assigned a distinct role, they were defined separately, and often contrastingly, to men.'
These contrasting public and private spheres underpinned the development of the common law inherited by both Australia and United
States. Upon colonization in 1788, the British common law was transferred to Australia. The exclusion of women from legal personhood,
particularly after marriage, had a firm foundation in the common law
fiction of coverture. As Blackstone explained in his Commentaries of
the Laws of England:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the mar-

riage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband:
under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything; and is
therefore .. . said to be covert-baron, or under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during marriage
is called coverture...
But, though our law in general considers man and wife as one person, yet there are some instances in which she is separately considered; as
inferior tor him, and acting by his compulsion. And, therefore, all deeds
executed and acts done, by her, during her coverture, are void.'

Thus, at common law, a married woman was either not a person at all,
or was such a subordinate person that she was taken to be coerced by
her husband into all a~tions for which she might otherwise be held
legally liable.' Blackstone viewed this as preferential treatment for
women, noting that "even the disabilities, which the wife lies under,

3.

SusAN MOLLER OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 9 (1979).

4. Id.
5. Id.at 10.
6. 1 WILLIAM

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWs OF ENGLAND 468-70 (2d

ed. 1799), cited in MOLLER OKIN, supra note 3, at 249-50.
7. MOLLER OKIN, supra note 3, at 250.
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are for the most part intended for her protection and benefit. So great
a favourite is the female sex of the laws of England."8 While coverture applied formally only to married women, its implications extended
in practice to all members of the female sex. Barred from higher education, public office, the professions, and most other vocations outside
the home, women had few economic options outside of marriage.9
The inequality of the sexes was further countenanced in the development of the framework of government in both Australia and the
United States. While neither the United States Constitution nor the Bill
of Rights specifically denied equal rights to women, both created an
exclusively masculine system of justice based on English common law
and eighteenth-century ideals of liberty, equality, and justice.1" The
framers of America's founding documents spoke of "men... created
equal" and "endowed... with certain unalienable rights."" Although
they made relatively frequent use of "persons," "people," and "electors," these terms, like the terms "men" and "individuals," were not
intended to be read as generic or universal. 2 That the framers did not
intend "persons" in the Constitution to mean other than "male" was
clearly indicated by Thomas Jefferson when he asserted: "Were our
state a pure democracy, there would still be excluded from our deliberations... women, who, to prevent depravation of morals and ambiguity of issues, should not mix promiscuously in gatherings of men."'
It was definitely not the original intention of the founding fathers to
leave open the possibility that women might qualify to vote at some
time in the fiture. 4 In fact, women were not mentioned at all in either document which purported to be the foundation stone for a free,
independent, democratic society for all (men). In The Federalist, the
only reference to women, by Alexander Hamilton, is a warning about
8. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 471, cited in MOLLER OKIN, supra note 3, at 250.
9. RHODE, supra note 1, at 10 (citing United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 361
(1966); ALFRED, LORD TENNYSON, LOCKSLEY HALL 50 (1842); LEO KANOWITZ,

WOMEN

AND THE LAW 35-37 (1969)).
10.

JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN

117 (1991).
11. See RHODE, supra note 1, at 19.
12. HOFF, supra note 10, at 117.
13.

M. GRUBERG, WOMEN IN AMERICAN POLITICS 4 (1968).

14.

HOFF, supra note 10, at 117.
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the perils to the state from the intrigues of courtesans and mistresses.15 Similarly, the constitutions of the Australian Colonies failed to
include women within their provisions, referring only to "males" or
"persons" assumed to be male. The fact is that, "[a]lthough subject to
the Constitution's mandates, women were unacknowledged in its text,
uninvited in its formulation, unsolicited for its ratification, and, until
the late twentieth century, largely uninvolved in its official interpretation'." 6 Beginning in 1839, state legislatures in the United States
enacted a series of reforms that removed the most blatant restrictions
on women's legal capacity at common law. 7 Over the next three decades, twenty-nine jurisdictions enacted Married Women's Property
Acts, which typically granted married women certain powers to make
contracts, hold and convey property, and retain their separate earnings.
By the turn of the century, such statutes were in place in three quarters
of the states. 8 In Australia, Married Women's Property Acts containing similar provisions were passed in the colonies from the late
1870s. 9 However, "[m]uch of the legislative support for [these reforms] arose neither from a desire to encourage married women's advances in the public sphere nor to equalize their position in the private
sphere. 2 Statutory provisions reflected this fact,21 and restrictive
judicial interpretations further blunted their progressive impact.
During the period 1869 to 1921, women in both Australia and the
United States sought constitutional equality and full citizenship from
the courts by challenging the remaining common law restrictions on
15.

RHODE, supra note 1, at 20 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at

54-55 (Alexander

Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 24.
18. Id.
19. See Married Women's Property Act 1879 (N.S.W.); Married Women's Property
Act 1890 (Queensl.); Married Women's Property Act 1883-1884 (S. Austl.); Married
Women's Property Act 1883 (Tas.); Married Women's Property Act 1915 (Vict.); Married
Women's Property Act 1892 (W. Austl.).
20. RHODE, supra note 1, at 24.
21. Id. at 24-25. The motivation for the legislation was the unsuitability of the doctrine of coverture in an expanding commercial economy due to the impediments it placed on
land and credit transactions. Furthermore, the exceptions to coverture developed in the courts
of equity were regarded as cumbersome and expensive to invoke and, therefore, the legislation was seen as a way to regularize these principles and extend them to the general public.
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their legal status.22 The central issue before the courts during this period was: to what extent should women be regarded as persons, and
therefore, full citizens in the eyes of the law?' As the following discussion highlights, judges evaded this central legal question by delivering decisions based on traditional common law stereotypes about women.24 The judgments classified women as second-class citizens and cast
serious doubt on their legal capacities as persons.' Juridical developments highlighted the limited impact of the Married Women's Property
Acts on the citizenship status of married women, even though such
statutes, and the case law construing them, had improved their property, testamentary, contractual, and fiduciary rights. 6 The courts refused
to recognize that these Acts, or the Constitution itself, could have been
intended to displace women's second-class citizenship status at common
law. Provisions which appeared to grant women equal protection and
remove the disabilities to which women were subject at common law
were read as narrowly as possible by the judiciary, thereby prompting
a need for further legislation. The judiciary was unwilling to remedy
women's legal status through a broad interpretation of constitutional
and legislative provisions.
III. RIGHT TO VOTE
A.

United States

The Declaration of Sentiments adopted at the 1848 Woman's
Rights Convention in Seneca Falls, New York, shows that from the
beginning, women's inability to vote was regarded as a central feature
of their oppression by men.' The right to vote was described as the

22. HOFF, supra note 10, at 151.
23. Id. at 152.
24. Id.
25. Id
26. Id
27. Jennifer K. Brown, The Nineteenth Amendment and Women's Equality, 102 YALE
L.J. 2175, 2177 (1993). The Declaration, which paraphrased the Declaration of Independence, proclaimed, "[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are
created equal," and declared that the first proof of men's "tyranny" over women was his
refusal to allow her to "exercise her inalienable right to the elective franchise." Declaration
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"first right" of a citizen.2" Women's advocates pressed for the right to
vote not only as a means to improve women's lives, but also because
it would symbolize recognition of women's "equal personal rights and
equal political privileges with all other citizens."2 9 As the first right of
a citizen, suffrage meant citizenship."
31 the opportunity arose for the suffragists
In Minor v. Happersett,
to test the extent of women's citizenship rights under the United States
Constitution. They relied in particular on the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of citizenship as a basis for asserting women's right to vote.
The brief before the Supreme Court of the United States began with a
bold statement that "there can be no half-way citizenship" under the
Constitution.32 In relation to the Fourteenth Amendment, it was argued
that voting for officials of the federal government was a privilege and
immunity of national citizenship, rather than simply state citizenship,
because these offices derived from the nature of federal government
created by the federal Constitution.33 The Court refused to address this
argument and considered only whether voting was a privilege and
immunity of citizenship. Delivering the decision of the unanimous
Court, Chief Justice Waite dismissed Virginia Minor's claim and held
that it had never been the intention of the framers of the federal or
state constitutions to enfranchise women." The Court admitted that
women may be "citizens" and "persons" under the Constitution, and
accordingly, Mrs. Minor was a citizen who was entitled to all the priv-

of Sentiments (1848), reprinted in 1

HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 70 (Elizabeth Cady
Stanton et al. eds., AYER Co. 1985) (1881).
28. Id.
29. 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 747 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., AYER

Co. 1985) (1881).
30. Brown, supra note 27, at 2178.

31. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). Virginia Minor had tried to
vote at the same time as Susan B. Anthony in the fall of 1872. Because she was not allowed to register, she filed a suit against the local registrar, appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, and ultimately appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
32. HOFF, supra note 10, at 171. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "All persons
born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the United States. .

.

. No

State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. Id. at 172.
34. Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 165-78.
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ileges and immunities of citizenship.35 Although women were citizens,
their citizenship was without substance. 6
The Court confirmed that the constitutional neglect of women by
the founding fathers had not in any way been affected by the passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Women did not derive any additional
protection from the Fourteenth Amendment despite its apparent conferral of equal protection.38 Consequently, the discriminatory provisions
of state electoral laws did not infringe the Fourteenth Amendment
where the subjects of the discrimination were women.39 Using parallel
reasoning to the Dred Scote' decision, the Court declared that historically, women constituted a special category of citizens whose inability
to vote did not infiinge upon their rights as citizens or persons.4 ' The
Supreme Court unequivocally endorsed women's second-class citizenship under the United States Constitution. The decision in Minor made
it clear that women could not simply claim equal rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, rather, they would have to force their way into
the Constitution by way of constitutional amendment. Women in the
United States demanded that both the state and federal Constitutions be
amended so as to give them a voice in the laws, a choice in the rulers,
and protection in the exercise of their rights as citizens of the United
42
States.

35. Id at 165.
36. Brown, supra note 27, at 2180.
37. Minor, 88 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 170.
38. The Court examined the state laws prior to federation and concluded that the
states placed qualifications on those citizens who could vote. Id. at 172. The Court concluded that "if it had been intended to make all citizens of the United States voters, the framers
of the Constitution would not have left it to implication. So important a change in the condition of citizenship as it actually existed, if intended, would have been expressly declared."
Id. at 173.

39. Since the Constitution of the United States did not confer the right of suffrage
upon anyone, the Constitutions and laws of the several states which "commit that important

trust to men alone" were not necessarily void. Id. at 178.
40. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
41. HOFF, supra note 10, at 173.
42. Brown, supra note 27, at 2181 (citing HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note

27, at 16). The suffragists gradually attained their goal, beginning with victories in the westem states and culminating in the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution on August 26, 1920. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
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B. Australia
In Australia, women were not granted the right to vote as citizens
until legislative amendments were made to the constitutions of the six
states and the Commonwealth Constitution. Before these amendments,
women and men were clearly differentiated as citizens.43 In South
Australia, the Constitution Act of 1855-1856 allowed men meeting the
age, residency, and property requirements to vote and stand for election
to the House of Assembly and Legislative Council, which together constitute the South Australian Parliament." The masculine gender only,
or the word "person" assumed to be male, was used in the Constitution. As a consequence, women could neither vote nor stand for Parliament. It required a constitutional amendment in 1894 (requiring an
absolute majority of both Houses of Parliament) for South Australian
women to bring an end to the two-tier system of citizenship in South
Australia. 5 South Australia then joined Wyoming, Colorado, and New
Zealand as the first jurisdictions in the world to grant the right to vote
to female citizens. Unlike these other jurisdictions, South Australia also
granted its female citizens the right to stand for and be elected to
Parliament. The other states followed in later years, and an amendment
to the Australian Constitution in 1902 conferred the federal franchise
on all Australian women.46
The attempt by Australian women to secure the franchise had the
advantage of the precedent set by Acts such as the Municipal Corporations Act 1861 (S. Austl.) 47 which made provision, without sex dis43. HELEN JONES, IN HER OwN NAME 123 (1994).
44. Constitution Act 1855-1856 (S. Austl.).
45. Constitution Amendment Act 1894 (S. Austl.) (franchise and election).
46. Electoral Act 1899 (W. Austl.) (franchise) and Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act 1920 (W. Austl.) (election); Women's Franchise Act 1902 (N.S.W.) (franchise) and
Women's Legal Status Act 1918 (N.S.W.) (election); Constitution Amendment Act 1903
(Tas.) (franchise) and Constitution Act 1921 (Tas.) (election); Elections Acts Amendment Act
1905 (Queensl.) (franchise) and Elections Act 1915 (Queensl.) (election); Adult Suffrage Act
1908 (Viet.) (fianchise) and Parliamentary Elections (Women Candidates) Act 1923 (Viet.)
(election); Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 (Cth.) (franchise and election).
47. Municipal Corporations Act 1861 (S. Austl.). See also Municipalities Act 1867
(N.S.W.); Local Government Act 1863 (Viet.) and Municipal Constitutions Act 1863 (Vict.);
Rural Voting Act 1884 (Tas.); Local Government Act 1878 (Queensl.).
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crimination, for all owners and occupiers of property who were of full
age to be enrolled on the Citizens' Roll and to vote in municipal elections. However, the apparently liberal nature of these Acts was put to
the test in the only reported Australian case which considered the right
of married women to vote under the equivalent Act in New South
Wales. When called upon to interpret the clear words of the Municipalities Act 1867 (N.S.W.) in 1893, the Supreme Court of New South
Wales held that married women had no civic rights.
The case, Ex parte Ogden,8 concerned a challenge to the election
of Henry Vernon at a municipal election on the grounds that two married women had voted. Mrs. Lipscombe and Mrs. White were on the
municipal roll, and it was argued that their disability as married women excluded their votes. The Municipalities Act 1867 provided that
"every person" of full age and a lessee or owner of property was entitled to be enrolled to vote. It was argued by counsef for Vernon that
the mere fact of enrollment was conclusive of the entitlement to
vote.49 The court dismissed this argument, stating that married women
were not persons in the eyes of the law, and that there was a distinction between status and qualification." Whereas a man of less than
full age who was enrolled to vote would thereby be qualified to do so,
in the case of married women, they were excluded by virtue of their
legal status. Justice Windeyer stated that he was bound by the English
5 ' where the court held that married women
decision of R v. Harrald,
did not have the right to vote in such elections. Although the Municipal Franchise Act 1869 (U.K.) 2 allowed women to vote, provided
they satisfied the requirements of the Act, it did not state whether
married women could vote. However, by virtue of the Married
Women's Property Act 1870 (U.K.), 3 women were granted the right
to hold property in their own name, and this enabled some women to
meet the property qualification of the Municipal Franchise Act 1869.

48. Ex parte Ogden, 14 N.S.W.L.R. 86 (1893).
49. Id. at 87.
50. Id. at 89-90 (Stephen & Foster, JJ., concurring).
51. R v. Harrald, LR 7 Q.B. 361 (1872) concerned a challenge to the election of
Charles Harrald on the ground that two married women had voted for him.
52. 32 & 33 Vict. ch. 55, § 9.
53. 33 & 34 Vict. ch. 93.
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But the court decided that because the Municipal Franchise Act 1869
was silent on the question of coverture and the Married Women's
Property Act 1870 failed to refer to voting rights, married women
continued to be disqualified from voting.
In Ogden, women's citizenship rights were limited by a narrow
interpretation of the law. The Municipalities Act 1867 granted women
the right to vote in municipal elections, and the only issue before the
court was the status of married women to vote in such elections. It
was open to Justice Windeyer to take the view that the Married
Women's Property Act, passed in 1879 in New South Wales, had removed the common law restrictions on women's rights,54 in particular
coverture, and that, accordingly, married women had full citizenship
rights which included the right to exercise a vote in municipal elections. The Municipalities Act and the Married Women's Property Act,
read together, could reasonably have been interpreted in favor of
women's rights. However, Justice Windeyer refused to interpret the two
Acts in this way, and in effect, refused to categorize married women
as women.5 The reforms effected by the Married Women's Property
Act were viewed as "exceptional," whereas women's common law
disabilities were regarded as "general" and as not being displaced in
the absence of an express legislative direction. 6

IV.

ENTRY TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION

Not only were women denied the fundamental citizenship right to
vote, women also found the judiciary unwilling to recognize their right
to choose their occupation and to enter the professions, in particular

54. See supra note 19.
55. Katherine S. Williams, The Public Law and Women's Rights: The Nineteenth Century Experience, CAMBRIAN L. REV. 80, 93 (1989). Justice Windeyer did not even refer to
the Married Women's Property Act 1879, suggesting that he regarded it as irrelevant.
56. Justice Windeyer could also have chosen to distinguish Harraldon the basis that
the electoral roll was conclusive and that a person who was enrolled could not subsequently
have their vote challenged. In fact, there were two cases of equal authority to Harraldto
this effect, cited by counsel, which were disregarded by Justice Windeyer in reaching his
decision, namely, R v. Tugwell, LR 3 Q.B. 704 (1868) and Ex parte Gale, 7 W.N.

(N.S.W.) 1.
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the legal profession, by sole reason of their sex. Although qualified for
admission to legal practice, women were barred through judicial interpretation of the word "person," whose meaning was restricted to the
male sex. The judiciary refused to concede that women were entitled to
the privileges of citizenship, which were undeniable where the citizen
was a male. It was only by virtue of legislative reforms that females
were granted access to a profession open to males as of right. This
was characteristic of women's struggle for equal participation in the
public sphere during this period. Whereas men were regarded as its
natural inhabitants, women were forced at every stage to have the normal rights of citizenship granted to them by males.
A.

United States

The first woman to attempt to gain admission to legal practice in
the United States, Belle Mansfield, achieved what would prove to be
an enormous hurdle for those who were to follow her, namely, judicial
recognition that she was a person. In 1869 she applied for the Iowa
bar examinations, aware of the gender restrictions of the Iowa Code of
1851." Fortunately for Miss Mansfield, the matter was heard by the
liberal and progressive Justice Francis Springer. 8 Justice Springer was
satisfied that she had the necessary qualifications of intellect and character to practice law, but felt constrained by the wording of the Iowa
Code. However, Justice Springer referred to another Iowa statute that
provided "words importing the masculine gender only may be extended
to females." Justice Springer opined that when a statute contained an
affirmative declaration of gender it could not be construed as an implied denial of the right to females." As a consequence of Justice
Springer's liberal interpretation, in June; 1869, Belle Mansfield became
the first woman to gain admission to the bar in the United States. The
decision of Justice Springer was, however, an anomaly in the subse-

57. Section 1610 of the Iowa Code of 1851 limited admission to "any white male
person, twenty one years of age, who is an inhabitant of this State" and who satisfies the
court that "he possesses the requisite learning. . . ." KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA 1638 TO THE PRESENT 12 (1986).
58. Id

59. Id
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quent development of the law in relation to the right of women to
enter legal practice. It was to be openly challenged and effectively
overruled by courts in other states and eventually by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
A mere two months after Belle Mansfield was admitted to the
Iowa State bar, Myra Colby Bradwell completed the Chicago bar exam
in 1869, which rendered her qualified to be admitted to legal practice.6" In support of her petition for a license to the Illinois Supreme
Court to practice law, she argued that the only matter for determination
was whether her sex disqualified her from practicing law. She relied
on the same argument that had been successful in the Mansfield decision in Iowa.6 In its initial rejection of her application, the Illinois
Supreme Court relied on the fact that Mrs. Bradwell was a married
woman, and therefore, by virtue of the doctrine of coverture, was unable to enter into contracts with clients. 62 Mrs. Bradwell was incensed
by the court's determination and filed a supplementary brief in which
she relied on the Married Women's Property Acts of 1861 and
1869,63 which conferred on a married woman the right to enter contracts and hold property as a feme sole. Mrs. Bradwell argued that for
the court to deny her the right to be admitted would be to disregard
the "liberal statutes of our State, passed for the sole purpose of extending the rights of married women and forever removing from our law,
relating to their power to contract in regard to their earnings and property, the fossil foot-prints of the 64feudal system, and following the
strictest rules of the common law.,

60. Id. at 14-15.
61. Id at 16; ISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAG, supra note 29, at 602. Mrs. Bradwell
argued that Section 28, Chapter 90 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, which provided that
"when any party or person is described or referred to by words importing the masculine
gender, females as well as males shall be deemed to be included," rendered her qualified for

admission. She further pointed to other Illinois statutes which provided for both rights and
obligations to be imposed on citizens of the state which were framed in the masculine gen-

der but which clearly applied to women.
62. ISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 29, at 603.
63. Id. at 603-09.
64. Id. at 608.
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The Supreme Court of Illinois had before it a clear opportunity to
declare that the Married Womens' Property Acts of 1861 and 1869,
read together, had the effect of removing all common law disabilities
on married women. However, the court chose to avoid this construction, and instead resorted to an interpretation of the Illinois statute
against a common law background that denied women full citizenship
status.65 In doing so, the court concluded that it was contrary to the

principles of the common law to grant women entry to the legal pro6

fession and that this could not be the intention of the legislature.
The court disregarded the reform Acts entirely, as occurred in Ogden,
in favor of adopting an interpretation consistent with the common law.
The court chose to deny women a citizenship right which could simply
have been declared as bestowed upon them by virtue of the recent
legislative initiatives that sought to remove women's common law
disabilities. The court played a crucial role in ensuring the continuation
of women's second-class citizenship status.

65. The court rejected the argument that because the Illinois Legislature had expressly
removed the common law disabilities in regard to holding property not derived from their
husbands, the legislature had therefore, by necessary implication, also removed other common
law disabilities in regard to making contracts, and invited women to enter equally with men
into those occupations from which they were presently barred. The court stated that the
Married Woman's Property Act of 1861 was to be given a narrow reading, and that to say
that the Act had relieved married women from all their common law disabilities would be
"simple misinterpretation." The court then referred to the Married Woman's Property Act of
1869, which gave married women the separate control of their earnings, and stated that this
Act was not relevant to the present case as "the sex of the applicant, independently of coverture, is, as our law stands, a sufficient reason for not granting this license." Id. at 610.
66. The court stated that, although it had a discretion to grant a license to practice
law, this discretion was limited to a person or class of persons who were intended by the
legislature to be admitted. The Illinois admissions statute had adopted the common law of
England, where female attorneys were unknown and where "God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of action" was "regarded as an almost axiomatic truth." Therefore, when
the legislature gave the court the power of granting licenses to practice law it was not the
legislature's expectation that this privilege would be extended equally to men and women.
There had been no legislation since then to change this legislative intent, except the Acts of
1861 and 1869. The court stated that they were not at liberty to exercise their power in a
mode never contemplated by the legislature and inconsistent with the usages of courts of the
common law from the origin of the system to the present day. It was not the province of
the court, "by giving a new interpretation to an ancient statute, to introduce so important a
change in the legal position of one-half the people." Id. at 611-12.
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Undeterred, Mrs. Bradwell filed a writ of error with the United
States Supreme Court. Her argument was based on the Fourteenth
Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution; namely,
that she was entitled to the same privileges and immunities as citizens
of all other states and that the State of Illinois could not limit admission to the bar to a class of citizens on the grounds of race or sex.67
Whereas her counsel, Carpenter, accepted that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not grant women the right of suffrage, he stated that
the professions were open to all citizens of the United States.6"
Whereas the states could determine qualifications for admission, such
as age and requisite learning, a qualification that a whole class of
citizens could never attain was not a regulation of admission, but rather, a prohibition.69 He challenged the Court to determine that married
women had no rights that were to be respected, and that the Fourteenth
Amendment, although it spoke of all persons and declared them to be
citizens, meant only male and unmarried female citizens.7" He also
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment should be taken to its "logical
conclusion," eliminating the principles of the common law regarding
married women and the express provisions of state constitutions and
statutes.7
The Supreme Court held that the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States did not extend to admission to practice in
the courts of a state, and accordingly, this could be abridged by the
States.72 The Bradwell decision was based on the Slaughter-House
Cases73 decision, which had been delivered the day before and had
placed severe limitations on the scope and meaning of the privileges
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.74 It has been

67. HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 29, at 615-22.
68. Id at 620. Carpenter conceded that the Fourteenth Amendment did not confer on
women the right of suffrage, which was the argument that the Court would accept in Minor.

69. Id.
70.
71.
72.
relevant
in both
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 622.
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). Citizenship of itself was not
as there were many distinguished (male) lawyers who had been admitted to practice
the state and federal courts who were not citizens. Id. at 139.
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
HOFF, supra note 10, at 165. In the Slaughter House Cases, the Court denied
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said that the Court's narrow interpretation in the Slaughter House Cases was probably influenced by its realization that a broad interpretation
would necessarily change the status of women.75 The Court refused to
even consider the argument that the apparent guarantee of equal protection in the Fourteenth Amendment had the effect of sweeping away
the relics of the common law on which women's second-class citizenship was based. In the Blackstone tradition, Justice Bradley, who wrote
the well-known concurring judgment of the Court, insisted that women
had no legal existence separate from their husbands despite the passage
of Married Women's Property Acts in a number of the states.76 For
Justice Bradley, the "law of the Creator" could not be superseded with-

out a clear, unequivocal statement to that effect by the legislature.
In Bradwell, the Supreme Court rejected the opportunity presented

to it to afford women, as a privilege or immunity of national citizenship, the right to choose their occupations, in particular to enter the
legal profession. It was available to the Court to adopt the view of

Justice Bradley in his dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases that "a law
which prohibits a large class of citizens from adopting lawful employment . . . does deprive them of [their] liberty; [t]heir occupation is
their property. Such a law also deprives these citizens of the equal
protection of the laws. . .. "' However, this also would have required
butchers the right to choose an occupation under the privileges and immunities clause and
stated that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could only be applied
to class distinctions based on race.
75. Id (quoting BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE
LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES

7-8 (1975)).

76. Id. at 165. Justice Bradley opined that for females to be admitted as members of
the bar was "contrary to the rules of the common law and the usages of Westminster Hall
from time immemorial and it could not be supposed that the legislature had intended to
adopt any different rule." Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 140. Justice Bradley declared that
it could not be affirmed as a historical fact that the right to practice law had ever been
established as one of the fundamental privileges and immunities of the sex. "The paramount
destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother." Id. at 141. This was the "law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be
adapted to the general constitution of things and cannot be based on exceptional cases." Id.
at 141-42. Accordingly, it was not a woman's fundamental right and privilege to be admitted into every office and position. It was within the power of the state "to ordain what
offices, positions, and callings shall be filled and discharged by men and shall receive those
energies and responsibilities, and that decision and firmness which are presumed to predominate in the sterner sex." Id. at 142.
77. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 122 (1872). It is ironic that Justice
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the Court to accept that the equal protection afforded to citizens by the
Fourteenth Amendment extended to all citizens regardless of sex or
color. The Supreme Court assisted in reinforcing women's traditional
subordinate role and confined that the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment extended only to men.
The Bradwell decisions illustrate the narrow view of women's
citizenship held by the all-male judiciary during this period. The judgments of both the Illinois Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court were founded on the assumption that women's legal status
was fundamentally different from that of men, and that women possessed only those specific rights, responsibilities, and protections that
the (all-male) legislatures chose to grant them. A decision to extend to
women any new right, such as the right to hold property, had no general effect on women's legal status. Any new right granted was carefully limited to its terms. This illustrates the incremental nature of
women's rights from the viewpoint of the judiciary. Each right granted
to women by the legislature was assumed to be read in the narrowest
terms and only excluded the common law understanding of women's
rights if there was a clear and express statement to that effect. As a
consequence of the Bradwell decision, women in each of the states had
to seek legislative endorsement of their right to practice law, as the
Supreme Court had denied that this right existed as a national citizenship right for women under the Constitution.
B. Australia
In Australia, the secondary citizenship status of women during
1869 to 1921 is illustrated by two cases involving the question of the
eligibility of women to enter the legal profession and to be appointed
public notaries. These decisions arose in a different constitutional
framework than those in the United States. Although there are constitutions in each of the Australian States and a Federal (Commonwealth)
Constitution, nowhere are there any constitutional guarantees of rights

Bradley dissented in this case and yet followed the majority in Bradwell. His argument in
support of the butchers was precisely the argument that would have granted Myra Bradwell
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment that she was seeking.
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as exist in the Amendments to the United States Constitution. Women's
rights, if they existed at all, were found in the common law. If the
right did not exist at common law, then specific legislation was required to confer that right to women. However, the distinguishing
feature of the Australian cases discussed below is that, at the date of
these decisions, Australian women had been granted the right of suffrage both at a federal level and in the six states. Furthermore, women
in Australia were granted the right to be elected to federal parliamentary office in 1902, and by 1923, all six of the states had granted women the right to stand for office.78 Despite the apparently liberal approach of the Australian legislatures in granting women this citizenship
right, women found that there was little relationship between their right
to vote and other citizenship rights when tested in the courts. The
unique feature of the Australian "persons" cases is that, unlike those
decided in other common law jurisdictions including the United States,
they were decided after Australian women had been enfranchised. Despite this, the view of the courts remained that women were not persons despite
their enfranchisement, the so called "first right" of citizen79
ship.
It was not until 1904 that women formally tested in the Australian
courts the extent of their citizenship rights in Australia, post-suffrage.
In Western Australia in 1900, a barrister, Mr. R.A. Haynes KC, wrote
to the Barrister's Board requesting permission to have his daughter
Edith articled to him under the Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (W.
Austl.). ° Although Edith Haynes' application as a law student was
approved, she was warned by the Board that it could not guarantee her
admission."' In 1904, she sought permission to be admitted to the
intermediate examinations. The Board refused her request on the
78. See supra notes 45-46.
79. Margaret Thornton, Embodying the Citizen, Paper delivered at Australasian Law
Teachers' Conference, Hobart, Tasmania 5 (Oct. 1994).
.80. Geraldine Byrne, Just Dears: Western Australia's First Women Lawyers, 21(4)
BRIEF 13, 13 (1994). The Barrister's Board supervised and regulated the admission of legal
practitioners.

For further discussion of the history of women lawyers in Australia, see Linda J.
Kirk, Portia'sPlace: Australia's First Women Lawyers, 1 AUSTRALIAN J.L. & HIST. (1995)

(forthcoming).
81.

Id.
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grounds that "women were not eligible for admission under the
Act.382 She then obtained an order nisi calling upon the Board to
show cause why a writ of mandamus should not be issued directing
the Board to admit her.83
The Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (W. Austl.) provided that "every
person" who complied with certain conditions was eligible for admission. Furthermore, the Interpretation Act 1898 (W. Austl.), Section 3,
provided that the masculine included the feminine. The Full Court of
the Supreme Court of Western Australia held that the words "every
person" in the Act did not include women, and that accordingly, women could not be admitted as practitioners. Justice Burnside stated that
"the right of a woman to be admitted is a misnomer.., the common
law of England has never recognized the right of women to be admitted to the Bar."84 Justice Burnside was "unable to find any instances
where any right has been conferred. It is a privilege which has been
conferred by the courts originally, and then has been regulated subsequently by statute from almost time immemorial, and which has been
confined to the male sex."85 Justice Burnside stated that throughout
the civilized world he had not been able to ascertain any instances
under the common law of the United States or England where the right
of women to be admitted to the Bar had been conferred. 6 He did not
find the argument "very forcible" that because the words of the statute
referred to "every person," the statute should include women. Justice
Burnside was not "prepared to start making law." He stated that "when
the legislature in its wisdom confers the right on women, then we shall
be pleased to admit them."87

82. In re Edith Haynes, 6 W.A.L.R. 209 (1904).

83. Id.
84. Id at 212-13.
85. Id at 214.
86. Id. at 213. Justice Burnside's research on this matter appears to be somewhat deficient as he did not appear to find the Mansfield case in Iowa. See discussion supra notes
57-59 and accompanying text.
87. Haynes, 6 W.A.L.R. at 214. Justice McMillan was concerned about the possibility
of women becoming judges if they were admitted to the Bar. He stated that the "change
was of such importance that it should be made, and in fact could only be made, by the
legislature. . . ." Haynes, 6 W.A.L.R. at 212.
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The only "authority" referred to by the court was the case of
Bertha Cave, who, in 1903, applied to join Gray's Inn in London as a
barrister.8 When the Benchers of the Inn refused to call her to the
Bar, she appealed against their decision to a special tribunal consisting
of the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, and five other judges.
The Benchers argued that the regulations of the Inns of Court indicated
that males only were to be admitted to practice at the Bar and that no
female had ever been admitted to the Inns of Court. The Lord Chancellor replied that there was no precedent for ladies being called to the
English Bar and that the tribunal was unwilling to create such a precedent.89 Although this was the only "authority" to which the Supreme
Court of Western Australia referred in Haynes, it was not bound by
this decision of an English Tribunal. The court refused to interpret the
clear words of the statute and declare that Miss Haynes was a "person," and therefore, eligible for admission upon complying with the
conditions of the Legal Practitioners Act.
What is unique about the Haynes case, unlike any of the other
"persons" cases in the United States, and indeed England and Canada,
is that Haynes was decided at a time when Australian women had been
granted the right to vote, and therefore, arguably had attained citizenship status."° However, it appears that the recently-attained citizenship
status of Western Australian women was inconsequential to the Supreme Court of Western Australia in reaching its decision. The genderneutral term "person" was found to encompass only male applicants for
admission.9 As occurred in the Bradwell case, the court avoided the
opportunity it had before it to confer upon women a privilege of citizenship, which was taken for granted where the subject was male. In a
case such as this where the legislation read literally to include women,
the court succumbed to the appeal of the tradition of the common law

88. Id at 211. Reference is made to this case in ALBIE SACHS & JOAN HOFF WILSON, SEXISM AND THE LAW: A STUDY OF MALE BELIEFS AND LEGAL BIAS IN BRITAIN AND

THE UNrrED STATES 28 (1978).
89. Reported in THE TrIES, Dec. 3, 1903. In the proceedings which lasted five minutes, Miss Cave addressed the Iribunal herself.
90. Women had been granted the right to vote in Western Australian State elections in
1899 and in federal elections in 1902. See supra note 46.
91. Thornton, supra note 79, at 6.
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in preference to the rights of the female citizenry. As a consequence of
this decision, Edith Haynes was never admitted to legal practice. It was
not until 1923 that the Women's Legal Status Act (W. Austl.) was
passed and the first woman was admitted to practice in Western Australia in 1930.92
The unwillingness of the all-male judiciary to confer on women
their full citizenship rights was not isolated to Western Australia, nor
to women's entitlement to enter legal practice. In South Australia,
although Section 33 of the Language of Acts Act 1872 (S. Austl.)
provided that in every Act of Parliament, all words of the masculine
gender also included the feminine, this did not extend to the rules of
court which were all framed in the masculine gender. When Doris
Jones bedame the first woman to enroll in law subjects at the University of Adelaide in 1910, she was undertaking studies to qualify for a
profession from which women were barred. The South Australian Parliament moved quickly to ensure that the restriction on women entering
legal practice was removed. The Female Law Practitioners Act 1911
(S. Austl.) guaranteed that women could proceed to admission as legal
practitioners on the same basis as men93 and enabled Mary Kitson, the
first woman law graduate from the University of Adelaide, to be admitted to practice in the Supreme Court of South Australia on October
20, 1917.
In 1921, Miss Kitson applied for appointment as a public notary
under the Public Notaries Act 1859 (S. Austl.), which would entitle her
to administer oaths and certify certain classes of documents. When her
application came before the Supreme Court of South Australia, the
court held that, despite there being no question as to her ability to
perform the duties and exercise the functions of a public notary, the

92. Women's Legal Status Act 1930 (W. Austl.). The enabling legislation passed in
the other states included the Female Law Practitioners Act 1911 (S. Austl.); Women's Legal
Status Act 1918 (N.S.W.); Women's Disabilities Removal Act 1903 (Vict.); Legal Practitioners Act (amendment) 1904 (Tas.); and the Legal Practitioners Act (amendment) 1905
(Queensl.).
93. Section 2 of the Female Law Practitioners Act 1911 provided that "notwithstanding
anything contained in any Act or any rules of court .

.

. any woman would be entitled to

practise as a barrister, attorney, solicitor or proctor of the Supreme Court on complying with
the rules of court."
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words "every person" in Section 3 of the Act did not include women.94 Justice Poole noted that, whereas the Parliament had removed
the restriction on women practicing as lawyers, it had not seen fit to
remove the common law restriction on women filling the office of
public notary.95 Justice Poole conceded that "person" was a term
which, in its ordinary sense, included both men and women.9" Although Section 26 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (S. Austl.) provided that words of the masculine gender included the feminine gender,
this was subject to Section 3 of the Act, which provided that if this
interpretation was inconsistent with the intent and object of the Act,
then the Acts Interpretation Act would not apply.97 The question was,
therefore, whether it was "inconsistent" with the object and intent of
the Public Notaries Act to construe "person" to include persons of both
sexes.98 Justice Poole relied on the interpretation of "every person,"
"every man," and "a person" in the common law cases of R v.
0
Crosthwaite,99 Chorlton v. Lings,"'
and Beresford-Hope v. Lady
°
Sahdhurst,' ' and concluded that because a woman could not fill the
office before the passage of the Public Notaries Act 1859, and because
the Act evidenced no intention to remove such a disability, to construe
the term "person" to include both men and women would be to give
the words a meaning inconsistent with the object and intent of the
Act. °2 The legislature alone could alter the law, and until it did so,
the court had to hold that no woman could be appointed a public notary.

103

94. In re Kitson, S.A. St. R. 230 (1920). Section 3 of the Act provided that "[e]very
person who shall be desirous of obtaining an appointment as a Public Notary . . . shall
apply by petition . . . setting forth such facts . . . as to his fitness and qualification to discharge the duties and exercise the functions of a Public Notary. .. ."
95. Id at 237. Justice Poole considered that the Female Law Practitioners Act 1911,

pursuant to which Miss Kitson had been admitted, was "not sufficiently wide in its terms to
give authority for her appointment." d. at 232.
96. Id at 232.
97. Id at 232-33.
98. Id at 233-34.
99. R v. Crosthwaite, 17 Ir C.L. 403 (1864).
100. Chorlton v. Lings, LR 4 C.P. 374 (1868).
101. Beresford-Hope v. Lady Sandhurst, 23 Q.B.D. 79 (1889).
102. In re Kitson, S.A. St. R. 230, 236 (1920).
103. Id at 237.
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The Kitson case is a dramatic illustration of the secondary citizenship status bestowed on women by the Australian judiciary."' Like
Edith Haynes, Miss Kitson was denied her application to be appointed
a public notary by virtue of the court's interpretation of "every person"
in the Act and its reliance on common law authorities. However, what
is remarkable about the court's reliance on these "authorities" is that
they were all concerned with women's enfranchisement in the United
Kingdom, an issue long settled in the State of South Australia."°5 In
1894, an amendment to the South Australian Constitution granted all
women the right to vote and the right to stand for Parliament (public
office), making it among the first in the world to do so."0 6 The significance of women's citizenship status in the State of South Australia
appears not to have impacted upon the judicial consciousness, although
more than a quarter of a century had elapsed. It was open to the court
to say that the amendments to the South Australian Constitution evidenced an intention on the part of the legislature to grant to women
full citizenship rights, which included the right to be appointed to the
office of public notary. The court could have dismissed these earlier
authorities simply on the basis that they were inapplicable in a jurisdiction which had recognized the full citizenship status of its women.
Furthermore, the fact that the legislature had a decade earlier, in
1911, enacted legislation to permit women to be admitted to practice in
South Australia, and the fact that it had been the Supreme Court itself
who had admitted Miss Kitson to practice, did not cause the court to
disregard the relics of the common law and its denial to women of
their full citizenship rights.0 7 It required yet another piece of legislation, the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1921 (S. Austl.), to grant
women a citizenship right taken for granted by men, namely, to permit
women to perform the functions of a public notary. 08

104. Thornton, supra note 79, at 6.
105. Id at 7.
106. See supra note 45.
107. Thornton, supra note 79, at 7.
108. Mary Kitson was appointed a public notary through the provisions of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1921 (S. Austl.), which removed sex and marriage as disqualifications for a person's appointment as a public notary or justice of the peace.
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This prompt legislative response suggests that the wider community
regarded the decision as anomalous. Nevertheless, the decision provides
striking evidence of the qualified meaning of citizenship attributed to
women by the judiciary in the post-enfranchisement era in Austra10 9
lia.
V.

SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS

The foregoing discussion highlights the fact that women in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were never properly accepted
as citizens in either Australia or the United States. Even after the right
of suffrage, women were not recognized by the courts as full citizens,
nor were they "persons." The view of the all-male judiciary was that,
as second-class citizens, women did not have an automatic entitlement
to the normal citizenship rights, privileges, or immunities that existed
as of right for men. If these rights were to be conferred on women, it
would only be by way of an express legislative enactment by an allmale legislature. During this period, every right or privilege which was
automatic as a corollary of citizenship for men had to be contested by
women.
The legacy of the philosophers' theories of the seventeenth century
persisted into the mid-twentieth century in the reasoning of the judiciary. Like these philosophers, the judiciary was far readier to uphold
women's traditional subordinate role than to acknowledge the importance of women's potential and their rights. They too were inclined to
view the "feminine" characteristics of women as immutable factors as the "natural condition" of women - rather than to recognize them
as largely the effects of the patriarchal conditions of society."0 It was
the judiciary who held to these views much longer than the legislatures
who were prepared at each stage to grant women citizenship rights,
which in turn were interpreted as narrowly as possible by the judiciary.
The constitutional and legal framework in which the judiciary
operated was underpinned by the notion of separate spheres that

109. Thornton, supra note 79, at 7.
110. MOLLER OKIN, supra note 3, at 273.
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viewed women incorporated into society not as the equals, but as the
subordinates of men.' The basis of women's inclusion in society
was their natural role and their occupancy of the private sphere, which
complemented man and enabled him to fully exercise citizenship rights
in the public sphere. According to this theory, the citizen was male,
and full rights of citizenship attached only to him. Therefore, the attempts by women during this period to convince the judiciary to declare as universal that which was fundamentally male was doomed to
failure. This provides an explanation for why women's attainment of
citizenship rights could only occur, and did occur, incrementally and
with substantial resistance from the judiciary. It also raises the question
of whether, in a society based on such foundations, women can ever
be full and equal citizens as their participation depends on their subordination."'
This Essay has sought to illustrate the pivotal role played by the
judiciary in the United States and Australia in reinforcing women's
traditional second-class citizenship status at common law during this
period. The judiciary was central to upholding women's position in
society, not as full citizens but as the subordinates of men. The common law and the constitutional framework that underpinned the system
of government in both countries was based on the notion of separate
spheres and required the judiciary to play the role it so capably did in
denying women status as full citizens in the absence of a clear legislative direction. The judiciary was crucial in upholding the status quo
and ensuring that women would attain citizenship rights only where the
legislative intent was clear. For women, the struggle from exclusion to
emancipation was one that was achieved only incrementally and with
substantial resistance. However, emancipation from the second-class

111. For further discussion, see CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988);
THE DISoRDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY (1989).
112. For a fuller discussion of these issues see Carole Pateman, Equality, Difference,
Subordination: The Politics of Motherhood and Women's Citizenship, in BEYOND EQUALITY
AND DIFFERENCE: CTmNSHI,

FEMNIST POLIcs AND FEMALE SUBJECTIvITY (Gisela Bock

& Susan James eds., 1992). Pateman argues that in order to achieve a "genuinely democratic
citizenship" where men and women are equal citizens, it is necessary for the different contributions of women to be valued rather than viewed as inferior as the rationale for their

subordination.
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citizenship status to which the women of this period were relegated did
not ensure for them equal citizenship status. The struggle to achieve
this status, and thus fIll equality, is one that lay ahead, and which
arguably is still to be achieved as we approach the end of the twentieth century.
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